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SECURITY

Should aDisability Benefits Claimant
Be Allowed to Show That Her Previous
Occupation IsObsolete?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 27-30. © 2003 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Prof. Grenig is a co-author of
West's Federal Jury Practiceand
Instructions (5th edition). He can
be reached at (414) 288-5377 or
at jgrenig@earthlink.net.

ISSUE
Can the commissioner of Social
Security determine that a claimant
is not "disabled" within the meaning
of the Social Security Act (the Act)
because the claimant remains physically and mentally able to do her
previous work, without first determining whether that previous work
exists in significant amounts in the
national economy?
FACTS
Pauline Thomas worked as a housekeeper until 1988 when she had a
heart attack. Thomas then worked
as an elevator operator until she
was laid off in August 1995. After
her position was eliminated,
Thomas applied to the Social
Security Administration for
Supplemental Security Income and
Disability Insurance benefits, claiming that she had a heart condition
and related medical problems.
According to her July 11, 1996,
application, she suffered from irregular heartbeat, high blood pressure,
dizziness, and fatigue. Thomas also
claimed that she suffered form low-

er-back problems caused by lumbar
radiculopathy and asserted that she
had fractured an ankle on July 8,
1996. She was 54 years old at the
time of her application.
The commissioner of Social
Security denied her application and
an administrative law judge upheld
the denial. The administrative law
judge (ALJ) found that Thomas had
hypertension, cardiac arrhythmia,
cervical and lumbar strain/sprain,
and a transient isehemic attack, but
that she did not have an impairment listed in the list of impairments that are presumed to be
severe enough to preclude any gainful work. The ALJ also found that
Thomas had the residual functional
capacity to perform at least light
work, and therefore that she could
perform her past relevant work as
an elevator operator. The ALJ
rejected Thomas's argument that
her past relevant work as an elevator operator no longer exists in the
(Continuedon Page 28)
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national economy. According to the
ALJ, Social Security regulations
excluded from Step Four of the
sequential process for determining
disability any inquiry into whether
the past work actually exists.
Holding that Step Four considers
only whether a claimant can perform her previous job, the ALJ ruled
that Thomas was not under a "disability" and ended the evaluation at
that point without proceeding to the
next step.
Thomas sought review by the U.S.
District Court for the District of
New Jersey. The district court also
upheld the denial, ruling that
Thomas was not disabled under the
five-step sequential process for
determining eligibility for disability
benefits because it found that she
could continue to perform her previous work as an elevator operator.
The district court ruled that even if
Thomas was unable to perform any
job that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy and
even if she met all the other
requirements for Disability and
Supplemental Security Income benefits, she still could not obtain benefits because the fact remained that
she could perform a job serving as
an elevator operator.
Thomas then appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Reversing the district court,
the Third Circuit agreed with
Thomas that she should have been
permitted to show that elevatoroperator jobs no longer exist in substantial numbers in the national
economy. 294 F.3d 568 (3d Cir.
2002) (en banc). Based on the relevant provisions of the Social
Security Act and the broader statutory scheme, the Third Circuit held
that for the purposes of Step Four of
the evaluation process, a claimant's
previous work must be substantial
gainful work that continues to exist

in the national economy. The Third
Circuit determined that a claimant
may proceed to Step Five by showing either that the claimant cannot
perform her past work or that the
previous work is no longer substantial gainful work that exists in the
national economy.
Although the literal language of the
regulation governing Step Four
appears to support the AL's decision to terminate the inquiry at
Step Four, the Third Circuit said
that this regulation should be read,
if possible, so as not to conflict with
the statute it implements. According
to the Third Circuit, a literal reading of the regulation regarding Step
Four would set up an artificial roadblock to an accurate determination
of whether Thomas can "engage in
any ... kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national
economy." The court explained that
if Thomas can show that elevatoroperator positions really are obsolete, then the fact that she still possesses the physical or mental capability to perform the duties of an
elevator operator would not establish that she can engage in any substantial gainful activity that actually
exists.
The Third Circuit concluded that
the ALJ should have allowed
Thomas to present evidence on
whether elevator-operator positions
are obsolete. If Thomas had made
such a showing, the court ruled that
the ALJ then should have proceeded
to Step Five of the sequential evaluation to ascertain whether Thomas's
medical impairments prevent her
from engaging in any work that
actually exists.
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted the commissioner's request
that it review the Third Circuit's
decision. 123 S.Ct. 1251 (2003).

CASE ANALYSIS
Title II of the Social Security Act
provides Social Security disability
insurance benefits for individuals
who are "under a disability" and
meet other eligibility requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The Act also
provides Supplementary Security
Income benefits for "disabled" indigent persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. The
Act defines "disability" as follows:
(1) The term "disability"
means(A) inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.
(2) For purposes of paragraph
(1)(A)(A) An individual shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are
of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him,
or whether he would be hired if
he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with
respect to any individual), "work
which exists in the national economy" means work which exists in
significant numbers either in the
region where such individual
lives or in several regions of the
country.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3) (providing the
same definitions for Supplemental
Security income benefits).

Issue No. 1

The Social Security regulations provide a sequential evaluation process
for determining whether a claimant
is under a disability. At Step One,
the commissioner determines
whether the claimant is currently
engaging in a "substantial gainful
activity." If the claimant is
engaging in a "substantial gainful
activity," the claimant is not eligible
for benefits.
At Step Two, the commissioner
determines whether the claimant
has a "severe impairment." If the
claimant does not have a severe
impairment, the claimant is not eligible for benefits. At Step Three, the
commissioner determines whether
the claimant suffers from an impairment on the list of impairments presumed to be severe enough to preclude gainful work. If he or she does
not, the commissioner moves to
Step Four.
At Step Four, the commissioner
decides whether the claimant
retains the residual functional
capacity to perform the claimant's
past relevant work. The claimant
bears the burden of demonstrating
an inability to return to past relevant work. If the claimant is unable
to resume the former occupation,
the evaluation moves to Step Five.
At Step Five, the commissioner has
the burden of demonstrating that
the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.
The commissioner argues that permitting a claimant to proceed to
Step Five if the claimant can show
that his or her past job does not
exist in significant numbers in the
national economy would convert
disability benefits into unemployment benefits. Thomas disagrees,
arguing that awarding disability benefits to a claimant who, as a result
of a qualifying impairment, cannot
perform any job that actually exists

is hardly the equivalent of providing
unemployment compensation.
According to Thomas, denying benefits because a claimant could perform a type of job that does not
exist seems nonsensical.
According to the commissioner, the
Social Security Administration's
construction of the Act is entitled to
great deference and is supported by
the text of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) and
the Act's evolution and history. The
commissioner contends that the
Third Circuit's construction is
inconsistent with Congress's intent
in enacting that provision. She
claims that the commissioner's longstanding construction serves sound
purposes in the administration of
the disability programs. The commissioner explains that the ability
to perform a prior job is the most
concrete and individualized measure of the individual's capabilities;
consequently, if the claimant is
in sufficient physical and mental
condition to perform his or her previous work, the impairment is clearly not so severe as to preclude
employment.
Rejecting this argument, Thomas
contends that the Third Circuit's
construction is superior to that of
the commissioner because it is the
only construction that harmonizes
the intent, result, and plain meaning
of the statute's defining provision in
paragraph (1)(A) with its effectuating/describing provision in paragraph (2)(A). Thomas says that the
Third Circuit's construction is the
logical manner in which to link the
remedial character of the Social
Security Act with the realities of the
workplace that need the remedy.
The commissioner argues that it is
speculative to hypothesize about
claimants who can do only one form
of work (a particular past job) and
no other, only to see that one form
of work cease to exist in significant

numbers in the national economy.
She states that no principle of statutory construction requires Congress
to anticipate-or imposes a presumption that Congress is deemed
to anticipate-such a remote
hypothetical case and to fashion
the definitions of disability, governing millions of claims each year, to
accommodate it.
On the other hand, Thomas asserts
that the commissioner's scientific,
statistical study on the availability
and existence of jobs for persons of
differing ages, schooling, skills and
physical capacities yields the empirical result that no jobs exist in significant numbers that can accommodate her residual capacity and
vocational profile. Thomas says that
the only job identified by the commissioner is Thomas's previous
occupation-an occupation that no
longer exists.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court is called upon
to resolve a disagreement among the
circuit courts of appeals with
respect to the proper construction
of the Social Security Act. The
Ninth and Sixth Circuits disagree
with the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Act. See Quang Van Han
v. Bowen, 882 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir.
1989) (indicating that the interpretation that the Third Circuit set out
is a reasonable interpretation, but
stating that it is "not the only one");
Garcia v. Secretar, of Health &
Human Services, 46 F.3d 552 (6th
Cir. 1995) (same). The Eighth and
Fourth Circuits also disagree with
the Third Circuit's position. See
Rater v. Chater, 73 F.3d 796 (8th
Cir. 1996); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d
1200 (4th Cir. 1995).
In Kolman v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d
212 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh
Circuit held that the AL should
have continued to Step Five because
(Continued on Page 30)
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the claimant's past job was a temporary position. In dicta, the court
observed that even if a claimant's
past job was a permanent position,
an ALJ would be required to move
to Step Five if that past job had disappeared. The Seventh Circuit noted that the fact a claimant could
perform a past job that no longer
exists would not be "a rational
ground for denying benefits." The
Seventh Circuit stated:
The failure of the regulations
to require that the job constituting the applicant's past work
exists in significant numbers
probably just reflects an
assumption that jobs that
existed five or ten or even fifteen years ago still exist. But if
the assumption is dramatically
falsified in a particular case,
the administrative law judge is
required to move on to the
next stage and inquire whether
some other job that the applicant can perform exists in
significant numbers today
somewhere in the national
economy.

omy, including cases in which the
claimant's former position is available to the claimant.
On the other hand, if the Third
Circuit's construction is upheld, it
has been suggested that the Social
Security Administration would not
be overburdened by a "broader
inquiry" because the Third Circuit's
construction does not change the
scheme of the sequential evaluation.
The burden will still remain with
the claimant at the Fourth Step.
The commissioner still will not need
to award disability unless it is satisfied that no other job existing in significant numbers can fit the
claimant's residual capacity.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Commissioner of Social Security
(Theodore B. Olson, Solicitor
General (202) 514-2217)
For Pauline Thomas (Abraham S.
Alter (732) 499-9400)

A decision by the Supreme Court to
uphold the commissioner's position
in the Thomas case would mean
that an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity is not "by
reason of" the impairment if the
claimant retains the physical and
mental capacity to perform the
claimant's former job. Because the
Social Security Administration
decides more than 2 million claims
for disability benefits each year, it
has been suggested that the Third
Circuit's interpretation would introduce a significant and unnecessary
new burden into the massive disability program. In addition, the
Third Circuit's construction could
preclude consideration of a
claimant's ability to do the
claimant's former work any time
that job does not exist in "significant numbers" in the national econ-

Issue No. 1

